Strategic move
A strategic move in game theory is an action taken by a player outside the defined actions of the game in order to gain a strategic advantage and increase one's payoff. Strategic moves can either be unconditional moves or response rules. The key characteristics of a strategic move are that it involves a commitment from the player, meaning the player can only restrict their own choices and that the commitment has to be credible, meaning that once employed it must be in the interest of the player to follow through with the move. Credible moves should also be observable to the other players.[1][2]
Strategic moves are not warnings or assurances. Warnings and assurances are merely statements of a player's interest, rather than an actual commitment from the player.
The term was coined by Thomas Schelling in his 1960 book, The Strategy of Conflict, and has gained wide currency in political science and industrial organization.[3]
References
- ^ Jahan, Sarwat; Mahmud, Ahmed Saber (2015-12-01). "Back to Basics: Strategic Thinking - Game theory analyzes behavior when decisions must take into account the potential actions of opponents". Finance & Development. 52 (4).
- ^ Gintis, Herbert; Gintis, Professor Emeritus of Economics University of Massachusetts and Adjunct Professor Department of Politics Herbert (2000). Game Theory Evolving: A Problem-centered Introduction to Modeling Strategic Behavior. Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-0-691-00943-8.
- ^ Schelling, Thomas C. (2015-11-06). The Strategy Of Conflict. Pickle Partners Publishing. ISBN 978-1-78625-216-6.
- Thomas Schelling: The Strategy of Conflict, Harvard University press (1960). ISBN 0-674-84031-3
- Avinash Dixit & Barry Nalebuff: Thinking Strategically: The Competitive Edge in Business, Politics, and Everyday Life, W.W. Norton (1991) ISBN 0-393-31035-3
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- Congestion game
- Cooperative game
- Determinacy
- Escalation of commitment
- Extensive-form game
- First-player and second-player win
- Game complexity
- Graphical game
- Hierarchy of beliefs
- Information set
- Normal-form game
- Preference
- Sequential game
- Simultaneous game
- Simultaneous action selection
- Solved game
- Succinct game
- Mechanism design
concepts
- Bayes correlated equilibrium
- Bayesian Nash equilibrium
- Berge equilibrium
- Core
- Correlated equilibrium
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibrium
- Epsilon-equilibrium
- Evolutionarily stable strategy
- Gibbs equilibrium
- Mertens-stable equilibrium
- Markov perfect equilibrium
- Nash equilibrium
- Pareto efficiency
- Perfect Bayesian equilibrium
- Proper equilibrium
- Quantal response equilibrium
- Quasi-perfect equilibrium
- Risk dominance
- Satisfaction equilibrium
- Self-confirming equilibrium
- Sequential equilibrium
- Shapley value
- Strong Nash equilibrium
- Subgame perfection
- Trembling hand equilibrium
of games
- Go
- Chess
- Infinite chess
- Checkers
- All-pay auction
- Prisoner's dilemma
- Gift-exchange game
- Optional prisoner's dilemma
- Traveler's dilemma
- Coordination game
- Chicken
- Centipede game
- Lewis signaling game
- Volunteer's dilemma
- Dollar auction
- Battle of the sexes
- Stag hunt
- Matching pennies
- Ultimatum game
- Electronic mail game
- Rock paper scissors
- Pirate game
- Dictator game
- Public goods game
- Blotto game
- War of attrition
- El Farol Bar problem
- Fair division
- Fair cake-cutting
- Bertrand competition
- Cournot competition
- Stackelberg competition
- Deadlock
- Diner's dilemma
- Guess 2/3 of the average
- Kuhn poker
- Nash bargaining game
- Induction puzzles
- Trust game
- Princess and monster game
- Rendezvous problem
- Aumann's agreement theorem
- Folk theorem
- Minimax theorem
- Nash's theorem
- Negamax theorem
- Purification theorem
- Revelation principle
- Sprague–Grundy theorem
- Zermelo's theorem
figures
- Albert W. Tucker
- Amos Tversky
- Antoine Augustin Cournot
- Ariel Rubinstein
- Claude Shannon
- Daniel Kahneman
- David K. Levine
- David M. Kreps
- Donald B. Gillies
- Drew Fudenberg
- Eric Maskin
- Harold W. Kuhn
- Herbert Simon
- Hervé Moulin
- John Conway
- Jean Tirole
- Jean-François Mertens
- Jennifer Tour Chayes
- John Harsanyi
- John Maynard Smith
- John Nash
- John von Neumann
- Kenneth Arrow
- Kenneth Binmore
- Leonid Hurwicz
- Lloyd Shapley
- Melvin Dresher
- Merrill M. Flood
- Olga Bondareva
- Oskar Morgenstern
- Paul Milgrom
- Peyton Young
- Reinhard Selten
- Robert Axelrod
- Robert Aumann
- Robert B. Wilson
- Roger Myerson
- Samuel Bowles
- Suzanne Scotchmer
- Thomas Schelling
- William Vickrey
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